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Abstract
As a result of the First World War, Poland regained independence and access 
to the Baltic Sea, which caused increased interest in maritime matters among 
Polish scholars. One of the manifestations of this interest was the founding of 
the Baltic Institute in 1925, the goals of which were to promote the vision of 
the Baltic Sea as an important part of the Polish nation’s life, construct a mar-
itime identity in society, and argue for Polish access to the sea against German 
revisionist arguments. As was typical in Poland, the Baltic Sea and related is-
sues were most often discussed from the point of view of Polish foreign policy 
and security, as well as the country’s place in the Baltic Sea region and in Eu-
rope. In the last years of the interwar period, the Institute also became more 
interested in cooperation in the Baltic Sea region and in Poland’s Scandina-
vian/Nordic neighbours. Scandinavian neutrality and Nordic unity were dis-
cussed and analyzed in relation to Polish interests and foreign policy. One of 
the results of this analysis was a proposal to transform Scandinavian neutral-
ity into a Scandinavian-Baltic version, thanks to which it would be possible to 
secure peace in Europe. 
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In Poland, the interwar period was a time of increased interest in the sea. 
The access to the Baltic granted by the Versailles Treaty was limited – a 
short coast connected with the rest of the country by the so-called Danzig 
or Polish Corridor, and no major port – but enough to inspire a certain 
fascination with maritime matters in parts of society. This was manifested 
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by grand gestures such as Poland’s Wedding to the Sea performed in 1920 
in Puck, as well as intellectual programmes calling for popularising mat-
ters related to the sea, and its strategic and economic role. This intellectual 
activity was the foundation for establishing a research institution called the 
Baltic Institute (Instytut Bałtycki). Its programme was ambitious: to pro-
mote the vision of the Baltic Sea as playing an extremely important role in 
the political, social and economic life of the Polish nation, and conversely: 
the Polish nation playing an important role in the Baltic Sea. The aim of 
this article is to present the Institute’s point of view on one particular 
aspect of maritime issues: Scandinavia and its relation to the other Baltic 
Sea countries, especially Poland, which can simultaneously be seen as an 
alternative to the already established Nordic unity by ways of redefining 
it into a wider, Baltic-Nordic shape.
The Baltic Institute and its activities
The Baltic Institute was founded on 31 August 1925 in Toruń.1 The initia-
tive came from circles associated with Związek Obrony Kresów Zachod-
nich (Association for the Defence of the Western Borderlands), which had 
existed in Poznań since 1921, and whose programme promoted the view that 
for a strong and independent Poland, the districts of Pomerania, Greater 
Poland and Silesia (i.e. the Western Borderlands) had to be developed and 
closely integrated with the rest of the country.2 The Institute’s main organ-
izer and first director was Stanisław Srokowski, a diplomat, professor of 
geography at the University of Warsaw, and an activist of the Association. 
The Institute’s statute was passed at its founding meeting, underlining the 
importance of the study of history and the current situation of the north-
western Polish territories, as well as the significance of the so-called Dan-
zig Corridor for the Polish raison d’état. 
The Institute set out with ambitious aims of initiating, conducting and 
disseminating research on the Baltic Sea; however, for most of its existence 
it had to work with limited financial and human resources, only actually 
formally employing one, and since March 1931 two researchers. One of them 
was Józef Borowik, its long-time director (after Srokowski resigned in 1926 
1  For a more detailed account of the Baltic Institute, its ideas and activities, see: Marta 
Grzechnik, Regional histories and historical regions: the concept of the Baltic Sea region 
in Polish and Swedish historiographies (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012), 37–75.
2  Bernard Piotrowski, W służbie nauki i narodu: Instytut Bałtycki w latach 1925–1939 
(Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 1991), 32.
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and his successor, Teodor Tyc, died shortly after assuming the post).3 The 
Institute mostly relied on collaborators, acting as the coordinator and ini-
tiator of research on Baltic Sea matters, encouraging cooperation between 
different scholars from the whole country. According to some estimates, by 
1931 the Institute cooperated with 337 authors in Poland and 163 abroad.4 
It can therefore be considered a representative voice on the research of the 
Baltic Sea in interwar Poland.
In 1936, a report of the Baltic Institute’s activities to that date was pub-
lished under a title which summarizes its main areas of interest: Dostęp do 
morza, zagadnienie pomorskie, wspólnota bałtycka – access to the sea, the 
Pomeranian question, and the Baltic Sea community. According to Józef 
Borowik, these keywords represent, in this order, the Institute’s evolution 
from a local to an international institution, with a wide network of con-
tacts and cooperation.5 The keywords’ sequence also reveals the Institute’s 
priorities, among which the question of Polish access to the Baltic Sea and 
generally the country’s position on its shores was undoubtedly paramount. 
Traditionally, since the end of the nineteenth century, maritime issues in 
Polish research have been perceived from the point of view of Polish inter-
ests, in particular Polish access to the sea, and in relation to questions of 
security and independence.6 Furthermore, for most of the twentieth cen-
tury they were also inseparably linked to the question of Polish-German 
3  Józef Borowik (1891–1968) was a biologist and ichthyologist by education. Before 
his association with the Baltic Institute, he worked, among others, in ichthyological 
laboratories in the Russian Empire (e.g. Uralsk, today in Kazakhstan), thereafter, in 
independent Poland, as an inspector of deep-sea fisheries for the Ministry of Agriculture, 
and as head of the Department of Economy and Organisation of Fisheries of the State 
Research Institute of Rural Husbandry (PINGW). During the Second World War, after 
his release in 1942 (he was arrested on 13 September 1939 and placed first in a labour 
camp and then in Stutthof concentration camp), he started renewing his scholarly 
contacts with the aim of re-establishing the Baltic Institute immediately after the end 
of the war. Even after the dissolution of the Institute in 1950, he remained active as a 
scholar and an expert on Baltic Sea and Pomeranian matters. For a detailed account on 
Józef Borowik’s life and work, see: Maria Boduszyńska-Borowikowa, Życie jak płomień: 
o życiu i pracach Józefa Borowika (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1972).
4  Czesław Ciesielski, “Z dziejów Instytutu Bałtyckiego,” Osiemdziesiąt lat Instytutu 
Bałtyckiego: materiały z konferencji naukowej 29 listopada 2005 r., ed. by Czesław Cie-
sielski (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwa Instytutu Bałtyckiego, 2006), 9.
5  Józef Borowik, “Przedmowa,” Dostęp do morza, zagadnienie pomorskie, wspólnota 
bałtycka, IV sprawozdanie dyrekcji I. B. przedłożone Komisjom Naukowym i Walnemu 
Zgromadzeniu w dniach 21–22 czerwca 1935 r., ed. by Józef Borowik (Toruń: Wydawnic-
twa Instytutu Bałtyckiego, 1936), 9.
6  Jörg Hackmann, “Zugang zum Meer: die Ostsee in der polnischen Historiografie,” 
Nordeuropaforum, 2 (2004) <http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/nordeuropaforum/2004-2/hack-
mann--joerg-43/XML> [accessed on 17 October 2012].
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relations. And so it was during the interwar period: the partition of Ger-
man (previously Prussian) territory granted Poland its access to the sea, 
and German appeals for revision of the Versailles Treaty continued to 
threaten this access. In face of this threat, the limited access to the sea and 
still strong sense of insecurity shortly after regaining independence, this 
view was even more appealing.7 From this idea followed an interpretation 
of Polish history as presented in historical publications of the Baltic Insti-
tute, according to which there was a direct relation between the country’s 
times of greatness and its active maritime policy, as well as, on the other 
hand, between its downfall and its neglect of such policy. For example, as 
Franciszek Bujak argued, turning to the south-east had distracted Poland’s 
leaders from the crucial issue of maintaining a strong presence on the Bal-
tic Sea coast and curbing the various German states’ eastward expansion.8 
The Baltic Institute attempted to promote its own vision of Poland and 
its place on the shores of the Baltic Sea. The core element of this vision was 
creating the so-called maritime outlook (światopogląd morski) in society 
and among its leaders. A consistent, active maritime policy was to be the 
result of the successful emergence of such an outlook. Furthermore, the 
activities of the Institute were supposed to provide arguments to support 
Polish rights to access to the sea, answering analogous projects of German 
researchers – first of all their arguments about Poles not being a maritime 
nation and not needing direct access to the sea, and about the “unnatu-
ral” status of the so-called Danzig corridor, which should be remedied 
by incorporating it into Germany.9 Only thereafter did the Institute aim 
to foster an interest in other Baltic Sea countries, including Scandinavia.
This promotional effort was carried out primarily through numerous 
publications, including monographs, edited volumes, reports, journals – 
including an English-language one, Baltic and Scandinavian Countries, 
7  This way of thinking had been most pronounced among the political thinkers of 
national democracy, concentrated around Roman Dmowski (see e.g. Grzegorz Radom-
ski, “Morze i problematyka morska w myśli politycznej Narodowej Demokracji (do 
1939 roku),” Morze i problematyka morska w polskiej myśli politycznej (XIX–XXI wiek): 
studia i rozprawy, ed. by Tomasz Sikorski and Adam Wątor (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe Wydziału Humanistycznego US Minerwa, 2014), 59–60), although it was not 
limited to them, and the Baltic Institute’s researchers had various political backgrounds.
8  Franciszek Bujak, “Kultury morskie i lądowe,” Światopogląd morski, ed. by Józef 
Borowik (Toruń: Wydawnictwa Instytutu Bałtyckiego, 1934), 1–19. See also e.g. Wacław 
Sobieski, Walka o Pomorze (Poznań: Nakład Księgarni Św. Wojciecha, 1928).
9  E.g.: Przeciw propagandzie korytarzowej, ed. by Józef Borowik (Toruń: Wydawnic-
twa Instytutu Bałtyckiego, 1930); Kazimierz Smogorzewski, Poland’s access to the sea 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1934); Sobieski, Walka o Pomorze; see also 
Piotrowski, W służbie nauki i narodu, 276–277.
331Marta Grzechnik: Equilibrium in the Baltic
which will be discussed below – and brochures. The latter were sent free 
of charge to press agencies, and research and trade institutions in order 
to inform them about maritime matters in general and the activities of 
the Baltic Institute. The Institute granted permission to reprint these bro-
chures even without naming their source in the hope of raising awareness 
and interest in the subject among journalists. By 1936, the number of the 
Institute’s publications exceeded 300 titles, according to Józef Borowik’s 
estimate.10 Furthermore, the Institute organized lectures on the topics of, 
among others, history, economics and geography. An example was a series 
of lectures organized between 1931 and 1933 in Gdynia, which were later 
published as a book Światopogląd morski, a volume referring in its title to 
the Institute’s main task – developing the society’s “maritime outlook” – 
and giving an overview of its activities and views. Some effort was also 
invested in publications in Western European languages, as it was recog-
nized that, due to language constraints, the German arguments were bet-
ter known in Western Europe. It was considered important that not only 
the German side of the argument was heard abroad.11 However, because 
of limited resources and problems arising from the fact that Baltic Sea 
research in Poland had to be organized from scratch after regaining inde-
pendence, this proved to be a difficult task.
Despite the Institute’s activities, and despite the fascination for the sea in 
parts of the country’s intellectual elite in the interwar period,12 the impact 
of these and other actions was not as great as the Institute’s collaborators 
might have wished. The northern direction was rarely of great interest to 
scholars in Poland; Polish scholarship traditionally concentrated on the 
east-west axis, the country’s relations to its neighbours in these direc-
tions, and its place in East Central Europe. Also, the fact that most major 
Polish cities and industrial centres were situated inland – with the excep-
tion of the new port and city in Gdynia, the construction of which was an 
10  Józef Borowik, “The work and publications of the Baltic Institute”, Baltic and Scan-
dinavian countries: a survey of the peoples and states on the Baltic with special regard to 
their history, geography and economics, 2 (1934), 265.
11  See e.g. Smogorzewski Poland’s access to the sea, 433–447; Piotrowski, W służbie 
nauki i narodu, 44, 276–277.
12  See e.g. Stefan Troebst, “‘Intermarium’ and ‘Wedding to the sea’: politics of history 
and mental mapping in East Central Europe,” European Review of History, 10 (2003), 
293–321; Marta Grzechnik, “Intermarium: the Baltic and the Black Seas on the Polish 
mental maps in the interwar period,” The Romanian Journal for Baltic and Nordic 
Studies, 6 (2014), 81–96. On maritime topics in literature, music and film, see: Grzegorz 
Radomski, “Morze i problematyka morska w myśli politycznej Narodowej Demokracji 
(do 1939 roku),” Morze i problematyka morska, 70.
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important element of interwar national propaganda – turned the nation’s 
attention away from the coast.
As far as the Institute’s influence abroad is concerned, the most impor-
tant point of reference was Germany. This was the main opponent against 
which scientific arguments were put forward. In fact, being aware of its 
much smaller resources, the Baltic Institute considered itself a lonely but 
morally superior outpost against the German institutes of Eastern and 
Baltic Studies, first of all the ones in Königsberg (which was familiar to 
Srokowski since he had acted as the Consul General there between 1920 
and 1921), Danzig and Breslau.13 In their own eyes, the Institute’s scholars 
were the defenders of the Polish coast, and thereby their country’s vital 
interests, against the vicious attacks of their greedy and aggressive neigh-
bours.14 Reactions in Germany to the Institute’s research were carefully fol-
lowed, and in the mid-1930s, Borowik noted: “Our effort and our capabili-
ties have stopped being disregarded. But unfortunately, we have not noticed 
that the idea of the revision of borders has been given up – even in the time 
of the [Polish-German non-aggression] pact – it has only been modified 
and the apparatus of revisionist action has been refined according to the 
new political situation. [...] It has to be openly said that this new, refined 
version of revisionism is more dangerous than the old one and requires 
from our side a much stronger and more developed research apparatus if 
we want our counteraction to be efficient.”15 
13  Piotrowski, W służbie nauki i narodu, 44.
14  Probably the best example can be found in: Sobieski, Walka o Pomorze, but also 
e.g. Józef Widajewicz, “Słowianie zachodni na Bałtyku,” Światopogląd morski, 46–47; 
Zygmunt Wojciechowski, “Rozwój terytorjalny Prus w stosunku do ziem macier-
zystych Polski,” Światopogląd morski, 93–94, and others. This way of thinking was, 
again, common with that of Roman Dmowski’s national democracy movement, which 
consistently considered Germany to be the main opponent of the independent Poland. 
War with Germany over control of the Baltic Sea coast was often seen as inevitable; 
see: Arkadiusz Meller, “Bałtyk, Powiśle i Prusy Wschodnie w myśli politycznej obozu 
narodowego (1918–1939),” Morze i problematyka morska, 96–97. On the other hand, anti-
German views with regard to Polish access to the sea were also expressed, for example 
in the propaganda of the Maritime and River League (Liga Morska i Rzeczna) and its 
successor Maritime and Colonial League (Liga Morska i Kolonialna), a popular organisa-
tion promoting in Polish society maritime issues, maritime education of young people, 
and later also colonial expansion, which was connected with the government circles of 
the opposing political option, Sanacja. See: Tadeusz Białas, Liga Morska i Kolonialna 
1930–1939 (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1983), 59–66.
15  Józef Borowik, “Sprawozdanie Zarządu Instytutu Bałtyckiego w dniu 22 czerwca 
1935 r.,” Dostęp do morza, 116–117.
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The Baltic Institute and Scandinavia
Countries around the Baltic Sea, including Scandinavia, were only included 
as a research topic in the last of the three themes of the Baltic Institute’s 
interest: the Baltic Sea community. As visible from Borowik’s summary, this 
theme was not a priority for the Institute, especially in the first period of its 
existence. Although the first director, Stanisław Srokowski, had looked for 
contacts and cooperation in research and political centres around the Bal-
tic Sea, at the same time he did not think that the Scandinavian countries 
should be the main area of the Institute’s research, since he did not con-
sider them to have any major influence on the Polish culture and economy. 
He himself favoured cooperation with the Baltic states and Finland.16 His 
network of contacts, however, disappeared after he resigned from his post 
as director. Knowledge about the Scandinavian countries was limited in 
Poland, and Scandinavian studies as a research field almost did not exist.
This situation changed to some extent in the second half of the 1930s. 
After the signing of the Polish-German non-aggression pact in 1934, the 
Baltic Institute found itself under pressure from the government – its 
main source of financing – to tone down the anti-German rhetoric of its 
publications and pay more attention to Scandinavia and the Baltic states. 
Additionally, the government’s foreign policy started turning to the north 
more often. For example, in the years 1937 and 1938 mutual visits of the 
Foreign Minister of Sweden Rickard Sandler to Warsaw and the Foreign 
Minister of Poland Józef Beck to Stockholm took place. During these vis-
its, the need for increased economic and cultural cooperation between the 
two countries was underlined, and declarations were made that in case of 
conflict the two countries would not find themselves on opposing sides.17 
Additional factors were the increasing trade connections (especially the 
growing export of coal from Poland to Scandinavia, mainly Sweden), which 
generated an interest in the region’s economy. The government assigned 
additional funds for the Institute’s activities, e.g. for publications in West-
ern European languages and for renewing efforts to establish or restore 
cooperation with research institutes in the Baltic states, as well as univer-
sities in Gothenburg, Lund and Uppsala.18
One of the manifestations of this increased interest in the Scandina-
vian countries in this time was the scientific journal Baltic Countries: a 
16  Piotrowski, W służbie nauki i narodu, 44–45.
17  Ibid., 260.
18  Bolesław Hajduk, “Problematyka skandynawska w działalności Instytutu Bałtyckiego,” 
Osiemdziesiąt lat Instytutu Bałtyckiego, 34.
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survey of the peoples and states on the Baltic with special regard to their 
history, geography and economics, published by the Baltic Institute since 
1935. Józef Borowik described its founding as an important step on the 
way to the intensification of scientific and cultural cooperation with the 
countries of the Baltic Sea region, and interest in the new journal was evi-
denced, for example, by articles and reviews received from that region.19 
The publication’s language, as well as the fact that the authors and editors 
came from different countries of the Baltic Sea region and beyond (Great 
Britain, USA) are an indication not only of the Institute’s plans to promote 
its vision abroad, but also of opening up to international research and dis-
course. Among the editors from Scandinavia were Nils Ahnlund, Halvdan 
Koht and Gunnar Myrdal20 (all three were listed, among others, as mem-
bers of the editorial board since 1938). 
The aim of Baltic Countries was to deal with the countries of the Baltic 
Sea region and their relations, with special regard to “the history, geogra-
phy and economics of the Baltic region,” but also without neglecting “its 
cultural and political, social, racial and religious structure;” in particular, 
the cultural, economic and geographical unity of the region was under-
lined.21 The interest in Scandinavia was expressed even more strongly in 
1937, when the journal’s title was changed to Baltic and Scandinavian Coun-
tries. Borowik estimated the number of researchers dealing with Baltic and 
Scandinavian issues that were reached by the journal at three thousand.22
Because of shortage of funding and staff, it was difficult to concentrate 
on more than one country; attention was therefore mainly directed at the 
biggest country with the most economic connections with Poland: Sweden. 
Only at the end of the 1930s did more lively political and scientific contacts 
with other countries of the region begin developing.23 Also, initiatives for 
cooperation, especially cultural, with Poland appeared in Scandinavia (e.g. 
the Baltic Institute began operating in Stockholm in 1931 and a committee 
19  Borowik, Sprawozdanie Zarządu Instytutu Bałtyckiego, 117.
20  Nils Ahnlund (1889–1957): Swedish historian, professor at Stockholm University 
College (today Stockholm University) in 1928–55, since 1941 a member of the Swedish 
Academy. Halvdan Koht (1873–1965): Norwegian historian and politician, professor at 
the University of Oslo (1910–40), in the years 1935–40 Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Norway (Labour Party). Gunnar Myrdal (1898–1987): Swedish economist, sociologist 
and politician, winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1974.
21  “Editorial Policy,” Baltic countries: a survey of the peoples and states on the Baltic 
with special regard to their history, geography and economics, 1 (1935).
22  Piotrowski, W służbie nauki i narodu, 242.
23  Ibid., 266–268.
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for cultural cooperation between Poland and Sweden in 193524), however it 
has to be said that the opposite side of the Baltic Sea did not play a promi-
nent role in the policies and research of the Scandinavian countries in the 
interwar period.25 
Similarly, the Baltic Institute’s ideas did not meet with much of a 
response on the other side of the sea. Its founding was reported as a posi-
tive development, for example in the historical journal Historisk tidskrift, 
and some of its publications were reviewed there.26 The founding of the 
journal Baltic and Scandinavian Countries was also commented on in posi-
tive terms and, as mentioned above, some Swedish and other Scandina-
vian authors and editors were involved in its publication.27 However, at the 
same time Polish historical research was most often regarded as filled with 
nationalistic propaganda, and the country itself criticized for its treatment 
of minorities and its excessively nationalistic attitude towards its neigh-
bours. Aside from this, Poland, with its short Baltic Sea coastline, and 
centres of political and economic power and cultural life situated inland 
(Warsaw, Cracow), was never considered a truly Baltic country, but rather 
a Central European one – contrary to the Baltic Institute’s vision but, as 
mentioned above, not completely contrary to the Polish nation’s own self-
image.28Also, politically speaking, Poland was not a desirable ally, as it 
could implicate neutral Sweden into the European system of alliances: it 
was an ally of one of Europe’s major powers, France, and had recently been 
at war with both the Soviet Union and Lithuania.29
If ideas of widening cooperation beyond the Nordic framework ever 
appeared in Sweden, they included the Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and 
possibly Lithuania – with which some cultural and historical links could 
be found in the time of the Swedish Great Power Era – but not other Bal-
tic Sea region countries. Also in this case, however, there could be no talk 
24  Ibid., 257.
25  Grzechnik, Regional histories and historical regions, 77–82.
26  E.g. “Underrättelser,” Historisk tidskrift, 54 (1934), 203–204; David Norrman, “Nyare 
polsk historisk litteratur,” Historisk tidskrift, 55 (1935), 77; “Underrättelser,” Historisk 
tidskrift, 55 (1935), 393.
27  “Underrättelser,” Historisk tidskrift, 57 (1937), 81–82.
28  Norrman, Nyare polsk historisk literatur, 77; Jan Szymański, “Sverige i polsk utri-
kespolitik 1918–1939,” Polen & Sverige 1919–1999, ed. by Harald Runblom and Andrzej 
Nils Uggla (Uppsala: Centrum för multietnisk forskning, 2005), 106; Kristian Gerner, 
“Sverige, Polen och den nya politiska ordningen vid Östersjön efter första värlskriget,” 
Polen & Sverige 1919–1999, 63–82.
29  Ibid., 70–71; Wilhelm M. Carlgren, Sverige och Baltikum: från mellankrigstid till 
efterkrigsår: en översikt (Stockholm: Publica), 19–20.
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of forging too strong connections, which could potentially expose Sweden 
(and other Scandinavian countries) to the threat of Soviet aggression. The 
Baltic states were, regardless of their historical Nordic connections, per-
ceived as potential sources of instability, and as the most vulnerable to a 
possible attack from the Soviet Union. The idea of rysskräck – fear of the 
Russians – can be mentioned in this context as arguably one of the main 
ideas dictating the direction of Swedish foreign policy throughout the twen-
tieth century. This attitude resulted, for example, in the Scandinavian lack 
of enthusiasm towards the Baltic states’ attempts to build a Baltic League – 
a form of a regional alliance – at the end of the 1910s and beginning of the 
1920s. This lack of interest from the north was one of the main reasons 
(apart from the disagreements between the alliance’s possible members, 
first of all the conflict between Poland and Lithuania) why the formation 
of the Baltic League failed in the end.30 It followed from a combination of 
geopolitical, historical and cultural factors; among them was not only the 
already mentioned policy of neutrality and avoiding involvement in any 
potentially risky cooperation, but also a strong feeling of Nordic unity, 
which, besides the positive dimension of cooperation between the Nor-
dic states also had a negative one: of sharpening the border between the 
Nordic region and the rest of Europe. Finally, cultural trends stemming 
from nineteenth and early twentieth century nationalism were not to be 
ignored, with their ideas of cultural differences between the Germanic and 
the Slavic peoples of Europe, imported, along with many other intellectual 
trends, from the German intellectual tradition.31
The concept of neutrality
One of the themes discussed by the Baltic Institute was that of Scandina-
vian neutrality, often in connection to the related subject of Scandinavian 
unity. Examples include two texts by Józef Borowik: a brochure Neutralność 
Skandynawii (Neutrality of Scandinavia) and an article in Baltic and Scan-
dinavian Countries, “The Equilibrium in the Baltic”.32 In a very similar ver-
30  See: Marko Lehti, A Baltic League as a construct of the new Europe (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 1999), 518.
31  See: Marta Grzechnik, “From moat to connecting link: Sweden and the Baltic Sea 
in the twentieth century,” Beyond the sea: reviewing the manifold dimensions of water 
as barrier and bridge, ed. by Marta Grzechnik and Heta Hurskainen (Köln, Weimar, 
Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2015), 130–139.
32  Józef Borowik, Neutralność Skandynawii (Warszawa: Spółka Wydawnicza Czasopism, 
1937); Józef Borowik, “The equilibrium in the Baltic,” Baltic and Scandinavian Coun-
337Marta Grzechnik: Equilibrium in the Baltic
sion the ideas expressed in these texts were also presented in an essay in 
the volume Contemporary World Politics published in 1939 in New York.33 
As mentioned above, Borowik was not only the Institute’s director, but also 
formally its only employee until 1931, and the most prolific author through-
out the interwar period. Also taking into consideration the nature of the 
Institute’s loose organisation, coordinating research rather than conduct-
ing it as such, Borowik’s voice can be considered as representative of the 
views of the Baltic Institute at the time. 
In his publications Borowik analyses the concept of neutrality, distin-
guishing its two aspects: theoretical (that is, the doctrine and norms of 
international law) and practical (the practice of policies and international 
relations). Both these aspects have common goals: impartiality in disputes 
and keeping peace. The author presents their development over time, from 
their origin in the doctrine of the freedom of the seas (mare liberum) of 
Hugo Grotius, their further development through – not wholly successful – 
attempts to regulate the question in the second half of the nineteenth and 
the beginning of the twentieth century (The Paris Declaration Respecting 
Maritime Law of 1856, the Hague Convention of 1907 and the London Dec-
laration concerning the Laws of Naval War of 1909), right up to the chal-
lenge to the doctrine of neutrality that was the First World War.
To these aspects, Borowik adds a third one: the psychological attitude 
of the whole of society. It is, according to him, at least as important – if 
not more – as the other two as the basis for the functioning of neutral-
ity in practice. He quotes a speech given in Paris by Rickard Sandler from 
1937: “Personally, and from the standpoint of my country, I prefer to speak 
of a ‘neutral attitude,’ which can be defined thus: Sweden is opposed to a 
policy of alliances and is not prepared to let herself be drawn into combi-
nations which would paralyse her freedom of action just when she might 
most need it. Instead of neutral countries, we should therefore speak of 
countries without alliances.”34 
Borowik himself mentions three factors determining this neutral atti-
tude: historical experience with traditions shaped by it, the country’s geo-
graphical location, and its current economic situation.
tries: a survey of the peoples and states on the Baltic with special regard to their history, 
geography and economics, 5 (1939), 95–100.
33  Józef Borowik, “The Baltic region,” Contemporary world politics: an introduction to 
the problems of international relations, ed. by Francis James Brown, Charles Hodges and 
Joseph Slabey Roucek (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1939), 298–315.
34  Borowik, Neutralność Skandynawii, 3–4; Borowik, The equilibrium in the Baltic, 96. 
Sandler is quoted by Borowik after Le Temps, 20 March 1937.
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The discussion about Scandinavian neutrality could not be complete 
without relating it to the question of Scandinavian unity – or solidar-
ity, as Borowik calls it – as the two are closely related. As the Baltic Insti-
tute’s director argues, this unity could emerge and consolidate thanks to 
advancement in technology during the nineteenth century, the economic 
development and increased welfare of Scandinavian societies following 
from that, and democratization, as well as religious and ideological toler-
ance, widespread in the Scandinavian countries.35 Furthermore, the basis 
for this unity was the outlook of society, the components of which were: 
respect for law, strong attachment to the democratic system, welfare – not 
only higher than in other countries, but also more evenly distributed – 
and, finally, the civic attitude resulting from all these factors. The citizen 
of the Scandinavian countries, Borowik writes, considers himself as the 
subject, not an object of the state’s actions.36
Therefore, when it comes to the concept of Scandinavian unity and neu-
trality in the understanding of the Baltic Institute, the most important ele-
ments related to society and its political culture: they were perceived first 
of all as a psychological attitude built on the basis of historical traditions 
and a democratic political system. At the same time, the ethnic and lin-
guistic aspects of Scandinavian unity were underplayed: “Scandinavians,” 
Borowik writes, “are more attached to their political system than to their 
Scandinavian origins.”37 To support this statement he reminds his readers 
about the failure of the German attempts to build a Germanic community 
based on ethnic affiliation, which was supposed to include, among others, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden, and which would lead to “all 
the Germanic tribes being absorbed by the German sea.”38 The Germans 
playing the ethnic card, Borowik remarks, turned out to be short-sighted, 
and their tactics with regard to the Scandinavian countries unsuccess-
ful: he sums it up with an anecdote about the German geographer and 
geopolitician Karl Haushofer, who “[...] gave a number of public lectures 
in Scandinavia in which he depicted the communist danger in glaring 
colours; but the unexpected result was that he succeeded in alarming all 
about the danger of help from Germany. Public opinion in Scandinavia 
reacted very energetically against these unofficial offers of help and made 
no secret of its distrust.”39 
35  Borowik, Neutralność Skandynawii, 14.
36  Ibid., 20.
37  Ibid.
38  Ibid., 19.
39  Borowik, The equilibrium in the Baltic, 98.
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By writing this, Borowik also aims to discredit the racist ideology pro-
moted at the time by Nazi Germany, with its idea of the superiority of the 
Nordic race, in which the Scandinavian nations were included. The dis-
pute with this ideology was a part of the Baltic Institute’s programme. For 
example in an essay “Zagadnienie rasy nordycznej w nauce i polityce” (“The 
question of the Nordic race in science and politics”), published in the vol-
ume Światopogląd morski, the anthropologist Kazimierz Stołyhwo analyzes 
the history and content of the theory of the superiority of the Nordic race, 
and refutes it as unscientific.40 Furthermore, from the very beginning the 
Institute’s research disputed the idea, promoted in the German historiog-
raphy, of a “German sea:” the Baltic Sea as the area in which the Germans 
(for instance in the form of the Hanseatic League, Medieval urban settle-
ment, the Teutonic Knights) had been the harbingers of European civiliza-
tion, and which was the German sphere of influence.41 All the more criti-
cal was the view of the Institute’s researchers on any project for increasing 
German influence in the countries of the Baltic Sea region.
Thus, putting the spotlight on its cultural and social aspects, and espe-
cially underplaying the ethnic one, Józef Borowik connects Scandinavian 
unity to the main theme of the Baltic Institute’s activities since its nascence: 
the threat that Germany posed to the balance of power and peace in the 
Baltic Sea region. Dealing with Baltic, including Scandinavian, matters, 
the Institute never lost sight of this problem – or that of Polish interests in 
the region. However, this focus in the analysis of the concept of neutral-
ity also had other functions, to which I will return in the further course 
of this article.
Neutrality and the League of Nations
At this point, it is worth considering the international context of the second 
half of the 1930s, when the Baltic Institute took an interest in the topic of 
Scandinavian neutrality. It was during this period that the failings of the 
international security system based on the Versailles Treaty, and the weak-
ness of the League of Nations, became clearly visible. This was manifested 
40  Kazimierz Stołyhwo, “Zagadnienie rasy nordycznej w nauce i polityce,” Światopogląd 
morski, 163–176; see also: Hajduk, Problematyka skandynawska w działalności Instytutu 
Bałtyckiego, 36. It is, furthermore, the most probable reason why in the Institute’s publica-
tions from this time the term “Scandinavian unity” (instead of “Nordic unity”) is used, 
despite the fact that Finland was often included: the term “Nordic” awoke associations 
with the Nazi Nordic ideology.
41  See e.g. Sobieski, Walka o Pomorze; Piotrowski, W służbie nauki i narodu, 261.
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for example during the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the Spanish civil 
war. The flaws of the system became all the more visible as the two Euro-
pean powers – Germany and the USSR – which had for some time been 
weakened as an outcome of the First World War, were regaining strength. 
Looking from this perspective Józef Borowik does not find many warm 
words for the system that turned out to be ineffective: he calls the enthu-
siasm for the League of Nations of the 1920s “blindness.” He also reminds 
people that the Versailles Treaty condemned the policy of neutrality as pro-
longing conflicts: according to the Treaty, instead of distancing themselves 
from conflicts, all countries should mobilize their forces in order to isolate 
the aggressor. With this in mind, Borowik expresses his amazement that 
even Sweden, which had been following a consistent policy of neutrality 
ever since 1809 (when after losing its war with Russia, it had been forced 
to give up Finland, and with it a large portion of its territory and popula-
tion), let itself be blinded in this way as well.42
Despite this reproof, it has to be said that there was no universal sup-
port for the League of Nations either in Swedish society or among the 
country’s political elites in the interwar period. Neutrality had, after all, 
proved to be the best solution during the First World War, enabling all three 
Scandinavian countries to avoid the conflict. This also made the question 
of Sweden’s engagement in the League of Nations complicated. Immedi-
ately after the war there were, roughly speaking, two schools of thought in 
Sweden about the new international order and security. The conservative 
opposition perceived the League as an elite club of the victorious powers 
acting in the interest of those powers, and would rather see Sweden main-
tain strict neutrality and base its security on a strong army. On the other 
hand, there were those who put trust in the effectiveness of the League and 
international disarmament as a means of keeping world peace. Swedish 
Social Democracy, led by politicians of cosmopolitan outlook and open 
to international cooperation, like Hjalmar Branting and Rickard Sandler, 
subscribed to this second view. The optimism of the Left was additionally 
strengthened by the post-First World War situation in Europe, especially 
the fall of several European empires.43 
42  Borowik, Neutralność Skandynawii, 6.
43  Ingemar Ottosson, Krig i fredens intresse eller neutralitet till varje pris? Sverige, NF 
och frågan om kollektiv säkerhet 1935–1936 (Malmö: LiberFörlag/Gleerup, 1986), 32; Bo 
Stråth. Folkhemmet mot Europa: ett historiskt perspektiv på 90-talet (Stockholm: Tiden, 
1993), 190.
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This made the disappointment with the weakness of the League of 
Nations, which became obvious in the 1930s, and especially after the inva-
sion of Abyssinia, even greater. With time, Swedish Social Democracy with-
drew from its earlier internationalist attitude into a more isolationist one. 
The change was reinforced with the folkhem (home of the people) ideol-
ogy, which had an anti-European dimension, setting the modern, social 
democratic, Protestant Sweden (and the Nordic region in general) against 
the conservative, capitalist, Catholic continental Europe. According to 
Bo Stråth’s interpretation, continental Europe was transformed in this 
way into the Other, and the threat in the immediate vicinity – the grow-
ing power of Germany and especially the USSR – was dealt with without 
being named explicitly.44
Józef Borowik observed this disappointment during his visit to Sweden 
at the time of the Abyssinian crisis. He had his own interpretation of the 
subsequent change of attitude towards the League of Nations, the country’s 
own neutrality and Scandinavia’s neighbours: the doctrine of strict neutral-
ity, “betrayed” (using emotional language typical of the Baltic Institute’s 
publications) by joining the League, gained favour again, and simultane-
ously Scandinavian cooperation started becoming more intensive. At the 
same time, it became clear that, in order to be effective, neutrality required 
an active stance and close cooperation between the countries practicing it.45
Isolationism
One of the basic features of the attitude of neutrality in the Baltic Insti-
tute’s understanding, which at the same time was closely connected to 
Scandinavian unity, was the right geopolitical position. This was because 
the indifference of society towards “the issue being the object of dispute, 
quarrel and finally war between the two opponents – whether the dispute 
is ideological or material” was put forward as the necessary condition for 
maintaining neutrality and impartiality in the face of conflicts. This was 
easiest to achieve if one was geographically distant from those conflicts.46 
Scandinavia’s geopolitical position was, therefore, especially favourable for 
the policy of neutrality: the sea served as a barrier – geographically, but 
also psychologically – separating Scandinavia from the rest of Europe and 
44  Bo Stråth, “The Swedish image of Europe as the other,” Europe and the other and 
Europe as the other (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2000), 366–367.
45  Borowik, Neutralność Skandynawii, 11.
46  Ibid., 14.
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its problems. At the same time, it was also a uniting factor for the Scandi-
navian societies. However, in the face of the new international situation, 
the Scandinavian understanding of neutrality underwent an evolution, 
according to Borowik, from: “We are far removed from your interests and 
disputes. Leave us in peace,” to: “We do not want to become involved in 
matters which do not concern us. We will not allow ourselves to be drawn 
into others’ disputes and conflicts.”47 But even taking geographical isola-
tion into consideration, this attitude required of Scandinavian politicians 
knowledge of European politics, because only in this way would they be 
able to recognize which matters indeed did not concern them, and – again – 
an active stance, in order to not be drawn into them.
That is why Borowik predicted that the constant changes in the inter-
national arena would force Scandinavian neutrality to evolve even fur-
ther. These changes included not only the already mentioned weakening 
of the League of Nations and the international security system represented 
by it, but also the development of communication, effectively decreasing 
distances and hence Scandinavia’s geographical isolation, as well as the 
increasing threat from neighbouring powers, especially Germany – the 
development which the Baltic Institute’s researchers never lost sight of. The 
direction of this further evolution was determined, according to Borowik, 
by the increasingly visible convergence of the Scandinavian countries’ 
policy of neutrality on the one hand, and the international and maritime 
policies of Poland on the other. Since it did not enjoy Scandinavia’s advan-
tageous geopolitical position, Poland could not realistically base its inter-
national policy on the same foundations as the Scandinavian countries – 
however, Borowik argued, in the face of the changes taking place in the 
world and in Europe, these Scandinavian foundations would soon lose 
importance. As a result, relations with the Baltic states and Poland would 
become progressively more important for Scandinavia, especially Sweden: 
“Scandinavia, in spite of its more advantageous geographical situation, is 
already not in a position to maintain and carry out the orthodox principles 
of neutrality; therefore it will be obliged, step by step and increasingly often, 
to adhere to Poland’s formulation of the essence of her foreign policy.”48 
This formulation can be summarized with the words “Nothing about 
us without us,” taken from the Nihil Novi constitution of 1505, and used 
47  Ibid., 21 (emphasis in the original).
48  Borowik, The equilibrium in the Baltic, 99. 
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by Foreign Minister Józef Beck as the guiding principle of Polish foreign 
policy since 1934.49
Borowik repeated this argument, presented for the first time in the bro-
chure Neutralność Skandynawii, in the article “Equilibrium in the Baltic” 
published in the last issue of Baltic and Scandinavian Countries, in April 
1939.50 Because of both the time of publication and the article’s audience 
(not only from Poland, but also from Scandinavian and English-speaking 
countries), he placed special emphasis on questions of security policy and 
connections between countries and blocks. Borowik’s aim was to show the 
importance of the Baltic Sea region on the global scale, pointing out its eco-
nomic potential, as well as that of the Oslo group.51 Poland was presented 
in the article practically as a regional power, the factor stopping Germany 
and the USSR from open and direct war. The same role was given further 
north to the Baltic states and Finland. For the Scandinavian countries, 
relations in the region were also extremely important.52
The analysis of the foreign policy and neutrality of Scandinavian coun-
tries presented by Borowik has a clear aim: to show that the Scandinavian 
countries should become involved in cooperation with the Baltic states 
and Poland, and redefine their neutrality and solidarity in a way that 
allows for the inclusion of these countries on the other side of the Baltic 
Sea. Furthermore, combining Scandinavian and Polish (and possibly the 
Baltic states’) ideas of international policy in this way was argued to be 
not only possible, but also in the interest of all of these countries. “There 
seems to be no reason,” Borowik writes, “why Scandinavian neutrality 
should not develop into Scandinavian-Baltic neutrality;” with time it could 
be expanded even further, beyond the Baltic Sea region, and include other 
neutral countries of Europe: Belgium and the Netherlands.53 It is in the 
49  See e.g. Marek Kornat, Polityka równowagi 1934–1939: Polska między Wschodem a 
Zachodem (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Arcana, 2007), 56; Marek Kornat, Polityka zagra-
niczna Polski 1938–1939: cztery decyzje Józefa Becka (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Oskar, 
2012), 9.
50  The following issue was printed, but the war broke out before it could be distributed, 
and the copies were destroyed by the Germans. See Zbigniew Machaliński, “Problematyka 
morska w czasopiśmiennictwie Instytutu Bałtyckiego w latach 1929–1939,” Osiemdziesiąt 
lat Instytutu Baltyckiego, 19.
51  The Oslo group was a group founded in 1930 with an initial aim of economic coop-
eration, and later also cooperation in foreign policy. It included the neutral countries 
of Europe: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Lux-
embourg.
52  Borowik, The equilibrium in the Baltic, 95.
53  Ibid., 99.
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success of this cooperation that Borowik sees the possibility of maintain-
ing the equilibrium in the Baltic Sea region mentioned in the title of his 
article – and by that, peace.
With this, we return to Borowik’s understanding of the concept of 
neutrality, and the importance he ascribes to its different elements. With 
them, he constructs a convenient framework, within which the proposed 
redefinition could be achieved: by using firstly the geopolitical argument 
(and showing that the geopolitical context undergoes constant changes); 
secondly, the cultural-social argument (the fundamental role of the atti-
tude, which can also be modified); and thirdly, the ethnic argument (the 
one that cannot be changed and could stand in the way of the presented 
idea of expanding cooperation – therefore it is downplayed). The psycho-
logical attitude and common interests of the societies under consideration 
are presented as more important for constructing a community than any 
ethnic and linguistic affinity.54
These views build up to an ambiguous assessment of the Scandinavian 
countries: on the one hand, admiration for the principles of neutrality 
and achievements of the Scandinavian societies is visible, for example for 
their civil society and the high level of evenly distributed welfare. On the 
other hand, they are encouraged to modify their foreign policies and take 
Poland as the example to follow, and to accept Poland as the key partner 
in cooperation.
Tasks of the Baltic Institute
In the presented vision of the Baltic Sea region, the Baltic Institute saw an 
important role for itself. It was necessary to make societies on both sides of 
the sea aware of how convergent their interests and policy aims were, and 
to form in Polish society a psychological attitude similar to the one that 
was the basis of Scandinavian unity. The Baltic Institute was ready to take 
up this task in Poland, as the promotion of maritime historical traditions, 
and the analysis of geopolitical and economic conditions were among its 
aims. At the same time Borowik was critical of the fact that the impor-
tance of historical traditions was often not appreciated in Poland, as if it 
was assumed that social attitudes and political concepts based on them 
could be formed “from nothing,” without paying attention to tendencies 
and traditions already existing in a society.
54  Borowik, Neutralność Skandynawii, 22.
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Furthermore, knowledge about Scandinavia was foreseen to be more 
and more necessary in Poland – the author regretted that it was still very 
low, which perpetuated stereotypes about Scandinavian countries as not 
playing an important role in the international arena, and their interests 
being very different from Polish interests. Borowik described the Baltic 
Institute’s and his own efforts in promoting knowledge about Scandinavia 
so far: contacts with Scandinavian researchers and activists, the journals 
Baltic and Scandinavian Countries and Jantar (Amber – a Polish language 
journal published since 1937, whose focus was similar to that of Baltic and 
Scandinavian Countries, and which often in fact published selected arti-
cles from there in Polish translations55), as well as other publications, e.g. 
a historical monograph Polska a Szwecja (Poland and Sweden) from 1935, 
in which the historian Władysław Konopczyński analysed the historical 
relations between the two countries and argued that they were “similar 
enough to understand each other and to cooperate, and different enough 
to need each other.”56 On a positive note, Borowik was of the opinion that 
the maritime awareness of Polish society was currently on the increase, 
which made him look with optimism to the future and see Poland as one 
of the guarantors of equilibrium in the Baltic Sea region.57
An advantageous circumstance for the realisation of the Baltic Insti-
tute’s postulates was the fact that, as mentioned above, at the end of the 
1930s the political climate for research on the Baltic Sea region became 
more favourable than before, and gradually the scope of Scandinavian 
studies in Poland was expanding. Soon, however, this development was 
interrupted by the outbreak of war.
What is striking in Borowik’s argumentation is his disregard for the 
deep cultural and social differences between the countries that he envis-
ages cooperating in one Scandinavian-Baltic region. The accusation of not 
appreciating historical and religious traditions, which he directs at the 
Polish observers of Scandinavian political and social life, also applies to 
his own idea of regional neutrality. The psychological attitude of Scandi-
navian societies, comprising, in his own words, of “respect for law, true 
democratism, a high and evenly distributed level of material culture,”58 
as well as the civil society built upon them, was, after all, a derivative of 
these historical and religious foundations, which were lacking in Polish 
55  Piotrowski, W służbie nauki i narodu, 243–244.
56  Władysław Konopczyński, Polska a Szwecja (Toruń: Instytut Bałtycki, 1935), 41.
57  Borowik, The equilibrium in the Baltic, 100.
58  Borowik, Neutralność Skandynawii, 22.
346 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2015, 3 (153)
society. This could not be changed even by the most intensive actions of 
the Baltic Institute. By the end of the interwar period, the Scandinavian 
societies turned their attention to the tasks of building the welfare state, 
the “home of the people,” and were drifting further away from, rather 
than towards, the culturally, socially and politically different countries 
of continental Europe.
Conclusions
The Baltic Institute’s view on Scandinavian neutrality, being a political 
programme constructed as a response to a growing threat, should be con-
sidered, as almost all issues the Institute dealt with, in relation to Poland’s 
interests and its access to the Baltic Sea. Preventing any of the regional 
powers from becoming dominant was, according to the Institute, of great 
importance to the whole continent, and it could only be achieved through 
cooperation among all the other countries of the region. The crucial fac-
tors were on the one hand the position of Poland, the buffer between the 
powers, and on the other, the attitude of the Scandinavian countries. This 
attitude, although praised equally with the countries’ social and political 
achievements on which it was based, was at the same time also criticized: 
strict neutrality and lack of interest in the affairs of the whole continent 
were no longer, according to the Institute, guarantees of lasting peace for 
Scandinavia. Rejecting arguments about the importance of ethnic and 
linguistic affinity of the Scandinavian countries (and even more so – Ger-
manic ones), the Baltic Institute in the 1930s postulated the construction 
of a new community of Baltic Sea region countries on the basis of the com-
mon interests of foreign policy and psychological attitude of the societies, 
which was supposed to guarantee not only equilibrium in the Baltic Sea, 
but also peace in Europe.
The question remains as to what degree the arguments presented here 
were realistic. Later events showed, as Borowik had predicted, that neither 
geographical isolation nor declarations of neutrality were enough to remain 
uninvolved in the conflict. However, in its basic premises and postulates, 
his programme was not very viable, especially in the political dimension, 
that is the actual possibility of remaining neutral in the geopolitical situ-
ation Poland found itself in. Also the psychological aspect, underlined by 
Borowik, was a hindrance, as the differences in this respect were in real-
ity much greater and more difficult (if not impossible) to overcome than 
the Baltic Institute’s director seemed to believe. Furthermore, the concerns 
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of security and foreign policy were pulling the countries of the Baltic Sea 
region in very different directions, with Scandinavia steering towards 
neutrality and isolationism, and certainly not towards any alliances with 
countries directly threatened by a possible Soviet aggression (the Baltic 
states) and implicated in the system of alliances with the European pow-
ers (Poland). As mentioned above, Scandinavian enthusiasm for any form 
of a Baltic alliance or cooperation was minimal, even at the beginning of 
the interwar period, when the situation in the region was less threaten-
ing. It is therefore not surprising that the Baltic Institute’s ideas for Scan-
dinavian-Baltic cooperation did not arouse any interest in Scandinavia – 
if they were even noticed at all.
What is more, they did not arouse interest even in the Institute’s native 
Poland, where – outside of the maritime-oriented circles such as those 
connected to the Baltic Institute – the northern direction was not the pri-
ority in any visions of consistent international and security policies. It is 
symptomatic that after the changes brought about by the next decades – 
the change of borders after the Second World War, and the new security 
brought about by NATO and EU membership at the turn of the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries – when Poland enjoys a wide and undisputed 
access to the sea, Baltic Sea topics have been neglected. The maritime out-
look envisaged by the Baltic Institute in the interwar period, and an active 
maritime policy following from it have never emerged.59 It can be said that 
the ideas of the Baltic Institute have not had a lasting impact, and the Insti-
tute itself, although reactivated after the Second World War,60 after the end 
of communism has faced serious financial problems.
However, it is precisely here that the interesting aspect of the idea 
lies: it proposes a double alternative. Firstly, it is an alternative to the tra-
ditional ways of thinking about Poland’s place in Europe, its east-west 
orientation and projects of systems of alliances in Central and Eastern 
Europe, which in fact often failed because of the hegemonic attitude that 
was inherent in this tradition, inherited from the pre-partitions times 
of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Even though Borowik also 
to some extent assumed this hegemonic attitude by presenting Poland 
as a regional power, the Baltic Institute had since its beginning prior-
itized Baltic Sea cooperation over imperialistic claims,61 and postulated 
59  See e.g.: Wspólna europejska a polska polityka morska, ed. by Jerzy Kujawa, Hanna 
Klimek and Tomasz Gutowski (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2007).
60  Reactivated after the end of the war, the Baltic Institute was then dissolved in 1950. 
In 1958 it was reactivated again, however, in a different form.
61  See e.g. Stanisław Srokowski, Instytut Bałtycki i jego zadania ([n.p.: n.publ.], 1926), 8–9.
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abandoning southeasterly expansion.62 The idea of the Baltic League, 
pursued by the Baltic states at the beginning of the interwar period and 
discussed above, can be recalled here. As Marko Lehti argues, besides 
the security aspect, it can also be interpreted as the Baltic states attempt-
ing to find a new frame of reference for themselves after the fall of the 
Russian Empire and their own independence. In this way, the Baltic Sea 
region was to become a means of reconceptualization of one’s position 
in the region apart from the traditional regional powers: Germany and 
Russia.63 In this sense, the Baltic Institute’s vision of Poland’s place in 
the Baltic Sea, developed in the following decade, can in a way be inter-
preted as an analogous attempt to redefine one’s own place in Europe in 
the face of growing threats.
Secondly, the project of redefinition of Scandinavian unity to include 
Poland and the Baltic states is also an alternative to another established 
structure: Norden. In some ways, this idea was similar to the one that 
appeared in the region several decades later, in the 1990s, as a reaction 
to the fall of the Iron Curtain. This time it originated on the other shore 
of the sea, with Nordic scholars proposing a redefinition of Nordic unity 
into the unity of the Baltic Sea region.64 Although this time it also ran into 
obstacles in the form of different traditions and attitudes, and divergent 
policies since the region continues to be very heterogeneous, on the whole 
it proved more successful, even if not as much so as to actually redefine 
Nordic unity. Equilibrium in the Baltic is, it would seem, not a result, but 
a prerequisite of Baltic Sea regional cooperation.
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Kokkuvõte: Tasakaal Läänemerel: Poola Balti Instituudi 
vaatenurk koostööle Põhjamaadega ja Läänemere riikidega 
sõdadevahelisel ajal
Esimese maailmasõja tulemusena taastati Poola iseseisvus ning ühtlasi 
juurdepääs Läänemerele, mis suurendas Poola akadeemilistes ringkonda-
des huvi merega seotud küsimuste vastu. Üks taolise huvi väljendusi oli 
1925. aastal asutatud Balti Instituut, mille eesmärk oli juurutada arusaama 
Läänemerest kui tähtsast osast poola rahvuse elus, ehitada üles uue Poola 
merelist identiteeti ning kaitsta Poola seisukohta mere-juurdepääsu legi-
tiimsuse osas Saksamaa revisjonistlike argumentide vastu. Nagu võiski 
oodata, käsitleti Läänemerd ja sellega seotud küsimusi reeglina Poola välis- 
ja julgeolekupoliitika vaatenurgast ning lähtuvalt riigi asukohast Lääne-
mere regioonis ja Euroopas. Sõdadevahelise aja viimastel aastatel tekkis 
instituudil aga suurem huvi ka Põhjamaade ning teiste Läänemereruumi 
riikidega koostöö edendamise vastu. Sellega seoses analüüsiti Skandinaa-
via neutraliteedipoliitikat ja Põhjamaade ühtsuse küsimust seoses Poola 
huvide ja välispoliitikaga. Näiteks käsitles Balti Instituudi direktor Józef 
Borowik nimetatud küsimust oma brošüüris Neutralność Skandynawii 
(“Skandinaavia neutraliteet”, 1937) ja artiklis The Equilibrium in the Baltic 
(“Tasakaal Läänemerel”), mis avaldati 1939. aastal instituudi ingliskeelses 
ajakirjas Baltic and Scandinavian Countries: a survey of the peoples and sta-
tes on the Baltic with special regard to their history, geography and economics. 
Borowiki analüüsil Skandinaaviamaade välispoliitikast ja neutralitee-
dist oli mitu eesmärki. Esiteks väitis ta, et Läänemere regioonil on oma 
kindel majanduslik ja poliitiline roll, mis muuhulgas väljendub kahe regio-
naalse suurvõimu – Saksamaa ja Nõukogude Liidu – lahus hoidmises. Tei-
seks arvas Borowik, et traditsiooniliselt rangest Skandinaavia neutralitee-
dist ei piisa enam rahu garanteerimiseks. Kolmandaks püüdis ta näidata, 
et Skandinaaviamaad peaksid üsna pea asuma koostööle Balti riikide ja 
Poolaga, kuna neil on välispoliitiliselt ühised huvid. Neljandaks väitis ta, 
et Skandinaavia neutraliteet ja ühtsus ei põhine mitte etnilisel sarnasusel, 
vaid geopoliitilisel kontekstil (mis olevat sel hetkel muutumas) ning “psüh-
holoogilisel suhtumisel” (mida on samuti võimalik mõjutada). Neist argu-
mentidest tegi Borowik järelduse, et Skandinaavia neutraliteet ja ühtsus 
tuleb ümber mõtestada Skandinaavia ja Läänemere ruumi neutraliteedi ja 
ühtsusena (mis ajapikku võib hõlmata ka teisi neutraalseid Euroopa riike: 
Belgiat ja Hollandit). Rõhutades järjepidevalt selliseid neutraliteedi ja üht-
suse elemente, mida oli võimalik muuta ning vähendades nende olulisust, 
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mida muuta ei olnud võimalik (nt etniline ja keeleline sarnasus), joonistas 
Borowik välja raamistiku, milles taoline ümbermõtestamine muutus või-
malikuks. Ta väitis, et taoline muutus oleks kõikide asjassepuutuvate riikide 
ühistes huvides, kuna nende omavahelise koostöö edu korral saaks säilitada 
artikli pealkirjas nimetatud tasakaal ja seega ka rahu Läänemere piirkon-
nas. Analüüsi teine, vähem selgelt väljendatud lisaeesmärk oli luua vastu-
kaal Saksamaa kasvavale mõjule regioonis ning diskrediteerida Saksa geo-
poliitikat ja rassistlikul põhjamaisus-ideoloogial põhinevaid ideid. Ehkki 
Borowiki mõtete teostumine polnud kuigi realistlik, on need sellegipoo-
lest huvitavad, kuna pakuvad välja alternatiivi nii traditsioonilisele viisile 
mõtestada Poola asukohta Euroopas (selle ida-lääne orientatsioon ja liidu-
suhted Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopas) kui ka defineerida Põhjamaid regioonina.
